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Federal antitrust jurisprudence has developed in this nation to
protect competition and consumers from the damaging effects of un-
reasonable restraints of trade including practices such as monopoli-
zation and price fixing. The law governing trade restraints
originated at English common law and has continued as a vital force
in a number of states. In recent years most state legislatures have
adopted affirmative antitrust programs to complement federal activ-
ity and to attack local commercial impediments.
The need for antitrust enforcement in the Commonwealth has
long existed; yet the Pennsylvania legislature has not resolved to au-
thorize the attorney general and injured private parties to vindicate
their rights through specific prohibitions that can be enforced with
effective remedies. This article describes that necessity through an
examination of the manner in which trade restraints have been han-
dled at common law and under statutory schemes. The particular
problems of Pennsylvania trade regulation are outlined and an anal-
ysis of recent legislative proposals is offered in an effort to guide
those concerned with antitrust problems to a worthwhile solution.
II. History of Antitrust Enforcement
A. Common-Law Basis
Prior to the enactment of the Sherman Act in 1890,'antitrust law
existed in various forms in different states based on the common
law.2 Contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade were considered
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1. Act of July 2, 1890, Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § I el seq. (1976).
2. See H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTrrRUST POLICY 9-54 (1954); Adler, Monopoliz-
void and unenforceable.' For example, the courts invalidated re-
strictive covenants that prevented an individual from practicing his
trade, damaged the public through decreased competition, and in-
creased the likelihood that the covenantor would become a public
charge.4 Subsequently, the common law was expanded to declare
void other contracts in restraint of trade. The courts refused to en-
force agreements established among manufacturers to fix prices and
divide profits because the combinations were established to create
monopolies that would inevitably injure the public.'
Nevertheless, astute businessmen sought to circumvent the judi-
cial decisions disfavoring contracts in restraint of trade by adapting
the trustee device as a business management instrument to avoid en-
tering into unenforceable contracts.6 The management of previ-
ously competing business entities or the resources of those entities
were thus subjected to centralized control, and the traditional basis
for attack under the common law was avoided.7 Thus, despite the
ability of the common law to adapt to changing business conditions
and, in many cases, to render agreements that restrained trade inva-
lid, the courts "never proved a very effective means in actually throt-
ing at Common Law and Under Section Two of the Sherman Act, 31 HARV. L. REv. 246 (1917);
Dewey, The Common-Law Background ofAntitrust Policy, 41 VA. L. REV. 759 (1955).
3. The law of contractual restraints originated with covenants, made by individuals sell-
ing their businesses, not to practice a trade in a defined area for certain periods of time. The
invalidation of these covenants was a carryover from the English common law. See, e.g.,
Mitchel v. Reynolds, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711).
4. Alger v. Thatcher, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 51, 54 (1837); cf. Anderson v. Jett, 89 Ky. 375
(1899) (broadly condemning any agreement that aims to interfere with free competition in any
line of business).
5. In Central Ohio Salt Co. v. Guthrie, 35 Ohio St. 666 (1880), enforcement was denied
when suit was brought against a non-cooperative member of a joint agency of salt manufactur-
ers who had agreed to fix prices and divide profits. In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), a resale price maintenance provision, requiring resellers in
the distributive chain to sell medical preparations only at the prices dictated by the manufac-
turer, was declared an invalid restraint on alienation. Although the case was decided by the
United States Supreme Court after the enactment of the Sherman Act, the ruling was based on
common law traditions condemning restraints on alienation and other disfavored contractual
restraints that are broader than necessary for the protection of the party who requires the
restraints.
6. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 48-49; see, I H. TOULMIN, A TREATISE ON THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, § 4.1-4.4, at 93-95 (1949).
"In practice, a trust resulted when the stockholders of a corporation deposited their certifi-
cates with a board of trustees. The latter were given full management control and power over
the corporations which were represented by these shares." 1 J. VON KALINOwsKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 1.03[5][b] n.l I 11 (1978).
Judicially the trust device has been defined as "[a] combination of interests for the pur-
pose of regulating and controlling by means of a common authority the use, supply, or dispo-
sal of some kind of property." Dairymen's League Coop. Ass'n v. Brockway Co., 173 Misc.
183, 187; 18 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556 (1940). See Harding v. American Glucose Co., 182 Ill. 551,
620, 55 N.E. 577, 600 (1899), appeal dismissed, 187 U.S. 651 (1902).
7. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910).
To the dismay of the ingenious business planners, however, these trust combinations were
often invalidated because the corporate charters of the individual organizations did not explic-
itly permit this type of arrangement. See, e.g., Richardson v. Buhl, 76 Mich. 632 (1889).
tling monopoly, much less in fostering competition."8  More
effective tools than strictly defined prohibitions were necessary to
combat anticompetitive practices. Penalties and remedies beyond
avoidance of the contract became essential.
B. Legislative Antitrust Policy
Although the federal government would ultimately take cogni-
zance of and act upon the need to regulate trade, the state govern-
ments developed the first legislative antitrust policies. Toward the
close of the nineteenth century, but before the enactment of the fed-
eral antitrust legislation, some state legislatures enacted statutes that
operated, albeit unevenly, against trade restraints9 "to declare un-
lawful certain restrictive contracts and agreements that were merely
unenforceable under existing common law doctrine."" ° Yet, for a
number of reasons state antitrust enforcement did not adequately en-
sure the unimpeded flow of trade. The statutory and common law
among the states lacked uniformity." Furthermore, compensatory
or punitive remedies for trade restraints were unavailable. More
importantly, however, a panoply of monopolistic practices appeared
beyond the reach of effective state enforcement.'
2
Finally, in 1890 Congress responded to the inadequacy of state
regulation and passed the Sherman Act. 3 This enactment was
designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty aimed
at preserving free trade and unfettered competition as the rule of
trade. It rests on the premise that unrestrained interaction of
competitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic
resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest
8. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 51. For example, in Dolph v. Troy Laundry Machin-
ery Co., 28 F. 553 (1886), the two largest washing machine manufacturers agreed to increase
their prices and divide the profit. The court found that the agreement did not unduly restrain
trade, for if purchasers were unwilling to pay the price demanded by the colluding competi-
tors, the consumers could seek to buy elsewhere. That holding was based on an old rule that
internal restraints binding only the parties are valid while external restraints aimed at third
party competitors are not. Perkins v. Lyman, 9 Mass. 522 (1813); Marsh v. Russell, 66 N.Y. 288
(1876).
9. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATORNEYS GENERAL, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS AND
THEIR ENFORCEMENT 1(1974) (hereinafter cited as STATE ANTITRUST LAws); Rubin, Rethink-
lng State Antitrust Enforcement, 36 FLA. L. REv. 653, 657 (1974). At least thirteen states had
antitrust laws before passage of the Sherman Act in 1890. Id
10. Rubin, supra note 9, at 660; see United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 279-94 (6th Cir. 1898), qf.'d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (discussion of state common-law doc-
trine).
11. H. THORELLI, supra note 2, at 36.
12. J. BURNS, ANTITRUST DILEMMA: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD MODERNIZE THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 6 (1969).
In the latter half of the 19th century the growth of industrial trusts and combina-
tions threatened the freedom of the market place and led to demands for legislation
to curb the increased concentration of economic power. The evils feared from such
concentration were restraints on competition resulting in higher prices, restrictions on
production and other market controls detrimental to the public interest.
Id
13. 15 U.S.C. § I ei seq. (1976).
material progress, while at the same time providing an environ-
ment conducive to the preservation of our democratic and social
institutions. 14
It was axiomatic that "the law... [did] not seek to hinder or punish
the successful businessman, but rather to guarantee that such success
[was] built upon an economic order patterned upon our cherished
philosophy of freedom of enterprise." 5 That guarantee was embod-
ied in two substantive prohibitions. Section One of the Sherman
Act 16 declared illegal all contracts, combinations and conspiracy in
restraint of trade. Section Two' 7 condemned monopolization, at-
tempts to monopolize and conspiracies to monopolize. Violation of
either section constituted a misdemeanor and was punishable by a
fine up to $5,000 and imprisonment up to one year. Temporary in-
junctive relief was also available to the government.'" In addition,
the statute provided for private enforcement by permitting persons
injured by antitrust violations to sue the alleged violator for treble
damages, costs of the suit, and reasonable attorney's fees. 9 Thus,
although the substantive prohibitions were essentially restatements
of the common law,2' the penalties obtainable by the government
and the remedy available to private plaintiffs represented an impor-
tant step beyond the historical bounds of trade regulation.
1. Judicial Applications of the Sherman Act. -As cases were lit-
igated under the Sherman Act, judicial interpretations of the statute
expanded and defined the broad proscriptions of Sections One and
Two rendering the statute flexible, but effective. For example, Sec-
tion One addresses all restraints of trade in interstate commerce,2 '
yet that provision is construed to prohibit only unreasonable re-
straints. 22 More importantly, however, since the problem of deter-
mining whether a particular restraint is unreasonable is often
complex,23 a number of restraints have been classified as illegal per
14. Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
15. State v. Lawn King, Inc., 150 NJ. Super. 204, 212, 375 A.2d 295, 299 (Law Div.
1977); Statement of Vincent X. Yakowicz, Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania, on House Bill 845, Before the Consumer Affairs Committee, House of
Representatives, Nov. 17, 1977 (hereinafter cited as Statement by Vincent Yakowicz).
16. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)).
17. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976)).
18. Ch 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), § 4, (amended 1911, 1948) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
4 (1976)).
19. Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), § 7, (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976)).
20. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179-80 (1911); Pulpwood
Co. v. Green Bay Paper & Fiber Co., 168 Wis. 400, 405, 170 N.W. 230, 232,cert. denied, 249
U.S. 610 (1919).
21. Trade is restrained whenever it is hindered, obstructed, or destroyed. United States
v. Keystone Watch Co., 218 F. 502 (E.D. Pa. 1915), appeal dimirsed, 257 U.S. 664 (1921).
22. Standard Oil Co. of NJ. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); Ace Beer Distribs., Inc.
v. Kohn Inc., 318 F.2d 283 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 922 (1963), rehearing denied, 375
U.S. 982 (1964).
23. See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.16 (1977).
se because the restrictions have a pernicious effect on competition
and lack any redeeming virtue.24 Horizontal price fixing-an agree-
ment by competitors determining at what price their products will
sell- is illegal on its face.25 Price fixing is also condemned per se if
it is imposed vertically in the distributive chain by a supplier upon a
reseller.26 Other trade restraints that are equally offensive per se
include dividing markets27 where, or customers to whom, competi-
tors will seek to distribute their products,28 organizing group boy-
cotts to victimize fellow competitors,2 9 and conditioning the sale of
desired products or services upon the purchase of undesired products
30or services.
Although the monopoly offenses of Section Two represent a
specific type of restraint on trade,31 trials for alleged monopolistic
practices are apt to be more complex than cases involving alleged per
se offenses.32  Of the three types of monopoly offenses proof of ac-
24. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). Restraints that are not
classified as per se violations are subject to the "rule of reason," and the defendant may intro-
duce evidence to substantiate the reasonableness of the restraint. Therefore, a plaintiff may
prove a per se violation by showing the existence of the restraint, while the additional proof of
unreasonableness of the restraint is necessary for a violation under the rule of reason.
25. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). Any tampering by
competitors for the purpose and effect of raising, depressing, pegging, stabilizing or fixing
prices is likewise illegal per se. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
26. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (maximum vertical price fixing); Dr.
Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) (decided under common-
law principles but applicable to § I of the Sherman Act). Vertical price fixing is commonly
known as resale price maintenance.
27. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (supermarket owners asso-
ciation could not allocate exclusive sales areas to members); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
Vertical market division (imposed by a supplier upon resellers), however, is subject to
invalidation only under the rule of reason. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433
U.S. 36 (1977), overruing& United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
28. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
29. United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966)(local G.M. auto dealers
cooperated to force G.M. to prevent certain dealers from selling to discount houses); Klor's
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 395 U.S. 207 (1959) (chain store induced suppliers to dis-
continue selling to a small competitor of the chain or to sell only at discriminatorily high
prices).
30. This practice is commonly called a "tie-in" and occurs when a seller with sufficient
economic power requires as a precondition for the purchase of a desired or "tying" product or
service the purchase of an undesired or "tied" product or service. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (railroad sold and leased land on the condition that buyers
and lessees shipped over its lines all goods produced on that land as long as the freight rates
were competitive). A more limited prohibition against tie-ins is proclaimed in § 3 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976), but in any event, tie-in arrangements are merely one specie
of unreasonable trade restraints.
31. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v.
Whiting, 212 F. 466 (D. Mass. 1914); see Dunne, Oregon's "Little Sherman Act, " 56 ORE. L.
REv. 331, 339 (1977) (monopoly cannot be considered illegal per se).
32. For example, litigation in United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., Civil
Action 69 (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan. 17, 1969), commenced nine years ago. Recently the Depart-
ment of Justice finished presenting its evidence in support of the charge that IBM is a monopo-
list. The presentation of the government's case required nearly three years during which
72,000 pages of transcript accumulated, in part from the 49,000 exhibits entered into evidence
tual monopolization is the most complicated. Two major elements
constitute monopolization:
(1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and
(2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distin-
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a supe-
rior product, business acumen or historic accident.33
The first requirement is said to exist when a competitor possesses
"the power to control prices or exclude competition. ' 34  The rele-
vant market must be ascertained to discover if the power exists.
This requires a determination of the appropriate product35 and geo-
graphic36 markets. The second major element of monopolization
can exist without the presence of specific intent, although the courts
have found the presence of general interest or deliberateness when
the monopoly was a probable result of the action pursued.37
The second type of monopoly offense, the attempt to monopo-
lize, is considered complete when trade practices are utilized "which
would, if successful, accomplish monopolization and which, though
falling short, nevertheless approach so close as to create a dangerous
probability of [monopolization]. . .. -38 This offense requires a
showing of specific intent before a violation will be found.
Finally, conspiracies to monopolize are said to occur when the
parties to a combination seek substantial control of the market along
with the restriction of competition.39
and the 69 million documents made available to the government by IBM. Wall Street Jour-
nal, April 27, 1978 at 8, col. 2.
33. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); Morton Bldgs. of Neb.,
Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 918 (8th Cir. 1976).
34. United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956). Cf.
United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (monopoly power may be inferred
from the predominant share of the market held by the alleged offender). Although courts
have not definitively identified the bounds of monopoly power, general guides have evolved.
See International Boxing Club v. United States, 348 U.S. 236 (1958) (81% market share consti-
tuted a monopoly); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir.
1945) (dicta-33% market shares insufficient; 60-64% represents a doubtful monopoly.)
35. The relevant product market is defined as the market in which products are reason-
ably interchangeable "for purposes for which they are produced-price, use and qualities con-
sidered." United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956). The issue
in the duPon, case was whether the relevant product market was cellophane (in which duPont
held a 75% market share) or flexible packaging materials (in which duPont held less than 20%
of the market).
36. The appropriate geographic market "is the area in which sellers of the particular
product or service operate and to which purchasers can practicably turn for such products or
services." ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 51 (1975).
See Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 385 U.S. 320, 327 (1961); Dunne, supra note 31, at
340 (relevant economic analysis may often extend beyond state lines).
37. American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
38. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 174 (1948). Furthermore, "a
vertically integrated enterprise like other aggregations of business ... will constitute a mo-
nopoly which, though unexercised, violates the Sherman Act. provided a power to exclude
competition is coupled with a purpose.., to do so." Id
39. Id.
2. Legislative Amendments-Procedures and Penal-
ties.-Because further measures were still required to supplement
the expanding field of trade regulation Congress enacted the Clayton
Act in 1914, ° which prohibited acts that were beyond the pale of the
Sherman Act when the probable effect of those acts was to substan-
tially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.4 1 Subse-
quent amendments to that law have strengthened the federal
legislative antitrust policy as deficiencies have appeared.
Section Five of the Clayton Act, for example, permits a private
plaintiff to submit as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation
any civil or criminal antitrust judgment in favor of the United States
government that would act as an estoppel between the parties.42
This provision considerably eased the burden of proof on parties in-
jured by antitrust offenses. A recent amendment provides that judi-
cial actions instituted by the government would also suspend the
statute of limitations from running against private suitors.43
Penalties for violation of the Sherman Act were increased in
1974", and all offenses were reclassified as felonies.45 Moreover,
actions instituted by the United States Department of Justice are no
longer limited to the remedies of imprisonment, fines and injunc-
tions. Now the federal government is entitled to sue for damages
sustained in its proprietary functions,' although recoveries are lim-
ited to actual rather than treble damages.47
Another needed change occurred in 1962 when the United
States Attorney General's antitrust investigative authority was
40. Act of Oct. 15, 1914, Ch. 323, 38 STAT. 73 (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 12 etseq.
(1976)).
41. Although the Sherman Act had a broad impact, certain activities were excluded
from coverage. The exemptions included the activities of labor or agricultural organizations
when these groups were pursuing legitimate self-help objectives. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
42. Id § 5(a); 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976). The only circumstance preventing a private
plaintiff from using a favorable government judgment existed when the government proceed-
ing terminated in a consent judgment entered before testimony was taken. Id
43. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Title III, § 302(2), 15 U.S.C.
§ 16(i). There are specific qualifications to this tolling provision. If the United States seeks in
its proprietary capacity to recover damages for an antitrust violation, the statute of limitations
continues to run. Furthermore, if a private suitor seeks damages or if a state attorney general
acts as parenspariae for residents of his state who have been injured through antitrust viola-
tions, see text accompanying notes 64-65 infra, either action must be commenced within the
period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued.
44. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 STAT. 1706;
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2, 3 (1976).
45. Id The potential terms of imprisonment rose from one to three years and the poten-
tial fines rose from $50,000 to $1,000,000 for corporations and $100,000 for other persons. Id
46. Act of July 7, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-137, § 1, 69 STAT. 282, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1976).
The federal government, for example, would sustain compensable injury if the firms from
which it purchased certain goods combined to eliminate competition and increase the price of
those goods sold to federal agencies.
47. The private treble damages provision in § 7 of the Sherman Act was incorporated
into § 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
strengthened by the Antitrust Civil Process Act.48  That statute em-
powered the Attorney General to issue and serve civil investigative
demands (CID's) 49 on persons under investigation if the Govern-
ment has reason to believe that they may be in control of documen-
tary material relevant to a civil antitrust investigation.50 Further
legislation augmented the scope of the CID to include demands
upon persons to give depositions, as well as to produce documents,
and to allow service upon any individual who may possess informa-
tion relevant to an antitrust investigation, as opposed to only those
under investigation. 5' Congress also established appropriate safe-
guards to protect the confidentiality of data obtained through
CID's.52
Despite the stricter penalties, however, the most significant ad-
dition to the antitrust laws is found in the provision allowing state
attorneys general to maintain actions in federal courts as parens
patriae for violations of the Sherman Act that cause injuries to natu-
ral persons residing within that attorney general's jurisdiction.53
Nevertheless, the effectiveness ofparenspatriae litigation is currently
48. Act of Dec. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 88 STAT. 1706, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-7 1314
(1976).
49. The CID is a data gathering tool that permits the United States Department of Jus-
tice to acquire evidence related to a civil antitrust investigation before a complaint has been
filed. The CID cannot contain a demand for any material that would be unreasonable if
contained in a subpoena duces tecum for a grand jury antitrust investigation or privileged
from disclosure in such an investigation. Id § 3(c).
50. Id § 3(a).
51. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 3, Pub. L. No. 94-435
(amending 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (1976)).
52. A custodian appointed by the Chief of the Antitrust Division of the Department of
Justice takes possession of the information thus obtained and may not release it for examina-
tion to anyone other than an authorized Department of Justice employee without the consent
of the person who produced the material. Antitrust Civil Process Act, Pub. L. No. 87-664, 88
STAT. 1706 (1974), 15 U.S.C. § 1313(e) (1976) (amended 1976).
53. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Title III, § 301, Pub. L. No.
94-435, 15 U.S.C. § 15(c) (1976). In the United States parenspairiae means the state as sover-
eign, "referring to the sovereign power of guardianship over persons under a disability."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1269 (Revised 4th ed. 1968). Millions of consumers who could
suffer slight overcharges in goods or services due to an antitrust violation might appropriately
be considered under a disability with respect to vindication of their rights. This is especially
true when each individual purchase represents a slight overcharge but the aggregate amount is
great. Due to the slight size of each claim, injured parties would find suit in federal court
unrealistic. The parenspatriae provision thus protects a right that otherwise might continue to
be violated with impunity.
Under the parens patriae authorization, Congress has designated methods to determine
the amount of damages suffered by each injured person. 15 U.S.C. § 15(d) (1976). The
means by which damages may be distributed are also governed by statute. 15 U.S.C. § 15(e)
(1976).
When a state attorney general pursues parenspatriae litigation, each person represented
may separately vindicate his injury by electing to exclude the portion of the claim attributable
to him, but the attorney general must first provide each such individual with notice of the
initiation of the parenspariae proceeding. 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b) (1976).
The authority of a state attorney general to sue for damages or injunctive relief on behalf
of consumers in his state was recently affirmed in In re Montgomery County Real Estate
Litigation, [1978-1] TRADE CAs. (CCH) 1 62,070 (D.Md. 1978).
in jeopardy. In 1977 the United States Supreme Court ruled in Illi-
nois Brick v. Illinois54 that indirect purchasers may not recover from
price-fixing competitors if the injured buyer purchased indirectly
from a middleman. Most antitrust violations that result in con-
sumer injuries do not arise from transactions directly between of-
fending producers and consumers. Therefore, when a state attorney
general sues as parenspatriae on behalf of those who sustain injuries
at a point in the distributive chain that is distant from antitrust viola-
tors, the state attorney general no longer has standing to pursue the
cause of action. Fortunately for injured indirect purchasers, both
houses of Congress have reported bills that would overrule Illinois
Brick." These bills are especially important because they contain
sections that would grant retroactive effect to the overruling statute,
thus preserving a number of claims presently before the courts. 56
3. The Result-State Antitrust Programs Became Subordinate
to Federal Antitrust Enforcement. -The same movement that pro-
pelled the development of federal antitrust policy apparently facili-
tated antitrust enforcement inactivity at the state level.57 Although
federal preemption was not mandated, state antitrust enforcement
assumed a substantially diminished role. The decline was attributed
to a number of factors58 that reflected legislative, executive, and pub-
lic apathy. Recently, however, state antitrust activity revived.
59
54. 431 U.S. 270 (1977).
55. On May 25, 1978 the Senate Judiciary Committee reported S. 1874 to overrule lli-
noisBrick. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 3-A (June 1, 1978). The House Judiciary
Committee reported H.R. 1142, a similar bill, on June 20, 1978 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG.
REP. (BNA) I I-A-12-A (June 22, 1978).
56. See reports cited in note 55 supra; Statement of Vincent Yakowicz, supra note 15, at
8.
57. J. FLYNN, FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 95 n.358 (1964);
Duane, supra note 31, at 353; Rahl, Toward a Worthwhile State 4ntitrust Policy, 39 TEx. L.
REV. 753, 755 (1961); Rubin, supra note 9, at 697-98.
58. Professor Rahi identified inadequate appropriations and lack of enforcement enthu-
siasm by state attorneys general as the primary reasons for state inactivity. Rahl, supra note
57, at 755. To that list Professor Rubin has added
ineffective or nonexistent investigative procedures, lack of trained full-time antitrust
personnel, cumbersome and often unworkable remedies and sanctions, antiquated
laws and procedures, the apprehension in many state capitols that vigorous enforce-
ment will drive industry from the state, and the forceful opposition of businessmen
and their attorneys to meaningful state reform.
Rubin supra note 9, at 697-98 (footnotes omitted).
59. Soma, Enforcement Under the Illinois Antitrust Act, 5 Loy. CHI. L.J. 25, 44 (1974);
Rubin, supra note 9, at 654, 699-701; State Prosecutors Crack Down on Business, Bus. WEEK
53 (May 15, 1978).
The resurgence in California is noteworthy because it represents the recognition that state
antitrust legislation is vital in industrial states. That resurgence was achieved, in part, through
the combination of the population explosion with its consequent increase in public procure-
ment, federal cases that revealed how illegal restraints on trade increased the cost of govern-
ment, and a lobbying effort by small businessmen. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS supra note 9, at
3.
Many states have enacted modem antitrust statutes6°, and numerous
state attorneys general are strengthening and more vigorously utiliz-
ing enforcement capabilities.61  In Pennsylvania, however, the prob-
lem is exacerbated because no state antitrust legislation has ever
existed.62 Moreover, the common law of trade regulation has not
developed to the point at which a modem antitrust jurisprudence is
identifiable.
4. Pennsylvania's Deficient Common Law of Trade Regula-
tions. -Pennsylvania retains the common law of restraint of trade
and monopolies as it existed before the enactment of federal and
state legislation. The archetypal unreasonable restraint of trade, the
overbroad covenant not to compete, has long been unlawful in Penn-
sylvania.63  In addition, when competitors have combined to re-
strain commerce by decreasing competition and, therefore,
increasing their market power, enforcement of the agreement has
been denied to a party to the combination. 4 Recently, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court noted in Collins v. Main Line Board of
Realtors6 that it would be guided by interpretations of the Sherman
Act as the embodiment of common law principles in ruling that a
real estate multiple listing service unreasonably restrained trade by
excluding competing realtors.
Despite that implicit recognition that Pennsylvania's jurispru-
dence regarding restraints of trade must be modernized, Collins sup-
plied no specific or broadly applicable substantive prohibitions.
60. Soma, supra note 59, at 44.
61. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 63-64.
62. Pennsylvania has an Unfair Trade Practices Act, which is modeled after the Federal
Trade Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). The federal law prohibits all unfair methods
of competition or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, while the state law
declares illegal only certain types of those methods or practices. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§
201-3-201-2(4) (Purdon Supp. 1978). These prohibitions are consumer protection regula-
tions prohibiting such acts as false advertising or passing-off and are not traditional antitrust
provisions. Furthermore, the remedies and penalties of the Unfair Trade Practices Act lack
the compensatory and deterrent effect of general antitrust legislation. There is no private right
of action; only the attorney general may enforce the law by seeking injunctions or assurances
of voluntary compliance, the latter of which may contain some compensation for those injured
by violations. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 201-4-201-5 (Purdon Supp. 1978).
63. Cleaver v. Lenhart, 182 Pa. 285, 37 A. 811 (1897) (based on failure of consideration);
see Sun Drug Co. v. West Penn Realty Co., 439 Pa. 452, 268 A.2d 781 (1970); Bachman v.
Gogel, 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 98 (C. P. Northam. 1970).
64. Nester v. Continental Brewing Co., 161 Pa. 473, 29 A. 102 (1894) (brewers prohibited
from fixing the price of beer in Philadelphia and Camden, N.J.); c. Schwartz v. Laundry &
Linen Supply Drivers' Union, Local 187, 339 Pa. 353, 14 A.2d 438 (1940) (union could not
impose requirement on employers to stop dealing with independent laundry transporters who
performed the same functions as union members).
65. 452 Pa. 342, 349, 304 A.2d 493, 496, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979 (1973); cf. Hirshfield
v. York Bd. of Realtors, Inc., 86 York 18, 59 Pa. D. & C.2d 243 (C. P. York 1972) (court
required showing that membership listing service was an economic necessity before member-
ship limitations would be found to unreasonably restrain trade). In Collins, Chief Justice Jones
based his dissent, in part, on the view that the multiple listing service does not unreasonably
restrain trade because it is not essential for all realtors. 452 Pa. at 359-60, 304 A.2d at 501.
The decision did not and could not add new remedies or penalties
for acts that would be antitrust violations-if an antitrust law were
in force. Of equal importance, no procedural innovations were in-
troduced in Collins. The remedy in that case was an injunction re-
quiring the realtors' association to allow Pennsylvania licensed
realtors to participate in the multiple listing service. The injunction
was merely the converse of declaring the exclusionary rules of the
association void and unenforceable-the antiquated common-law
remedy. The recognition that private damage actions66 along with
governmental criminal and civil penalties might be appropriate re-
medial and deterrent tools was notably absent. Such a declaration
is properly within the sphere of the legislature.67
III. The Need for State Antitrust in Pennsylvania
As Mr. Justice Marshall observed
[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are
the Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the
preservation of economic freedom and our free enterprise system
as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our fundamental per-
sonal freedoms. And a freedom guaranteed each and every busi-
ness, no matter how small, be it the freedom to compete-- to assert
with vigor, imagination, devotion and ingenuity whatever eco-
nomic muscle it can muster.
68
Forty-six69 state legislatures, including those of every major indus-
trial state except Pennsylvania, have acknowledged that the free-
doms identified by Justice Marshall require more extensive
protection than that afforded by federal legislation.
Federal antitrust enforcement is limited in a variety of ways, the
most fundamental of which is the interstate commerce requirement.
The United States Department of Justice has jurisdiction to act only
66. The Court did mention that it would grant injunctive relief when, ter ala, legal
relief is inadequate although there are no reported cases in which a Pennsylvania court has
awarded damages to an injured person not a party to a contract unreasonably restraining
trade.
Inadequate private remedies have been a primary cause for public apathy toward state
antitrust activities. Note, The Present Revival and Future Course of State Antitrust Enforce-
meat, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 584 (1963) [hereinafter cited as State Antitrust Revival. The
ineffectiveness of common law prohibitions and relief have also been criticized in Oregon.
Dunne, supra note 31, at 332. But see general y 35 U. PITT. L. REv. 323 (1973).
67. Criminal penalties have been oft cited as a valuable deterrent to antitrust violation
see notes 168-171 and accompanying text infra and they have a common-law origin for such
practices as conspiracy to monopolize. H. THORELLI, 5upra note 2, at 53. It would be inappro-
priate, however, for a Pennsylvania court to impose a criminal penalty for a common law
offense, because the Commonwealth's criminal law is now statutory. See People v. Legeri,
239 App. Div. 47, 266 N.Y.S. 86 (1933). Although criminal conspiracy is illegal in Penn-
sylvania, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. AN. § 903(a) (Purdon 1973), monopolization is not a crime in
the Commonwealth; therefore, conspiracy to monopolize is not a crime in Pennsylvania.
68. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
69. States with no antitrust law include Delaware, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Ver-
mont
when a challenged restraint is in, or substantially affects, commerce
between the states.7" In Penthouse International LTD v. Putka,71 a
concessionaire at Cleveland Hopkins International Airport was pro-
hibited from selling Penthouse Magazine. Even though the conces-
sionaire employed items of equipment and purchased for sale some
consumer products that moved at various times in interstate com-
merce, the court ruled that only a decidedly local effect resulted from
removal of the magazines (along with certain other products) from
sale, and, therefore, Sherman Act jurisdiction was absent.72  Rose-
mound Sand and Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand and Gravel73 represents
an even more glaring example of the necessity for state antitrust en-
forcement. In that case the plaintiff, a supplier of sand and gravel,
alleged that the defendant threatened one of the plaintiff's customers
with the discontinuance of business relations if that customer did not
terminate all purchases from the plaintiff.7 The court declined to
decide the case on the merits because the sand and gravel that the
defendant supplied was sold in Louisiana for Louisiana projects and
never entered the flow of interstate commerce.75 Other cases in
which subject matter jurisdiction was denied for failure to meet the
threshold requirements include conspiracy to prevent construction of
a competing bowling alley,76 restrictive covenants in shopping center
leases, 77 and price fixing of commission rates by competing real-
tors.78  A number of specific exemptions from the Sherman Act
could also properly be attacked on the state level.79
70. Penthouse Int'l LTD. v. Putka, 436 F. Supp. 1220, 1230 (N.D. Ohio 1977); McClain
v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 982, 983 (E.D. La. 1977); St. Anthony-
Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1045 (D. Minn. 1970); UNIFORM
STATE ANTITRUST AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note; Soma, supra note 59 at 332; see, e.g.,
Rahl, supra note 57, at 759.
71. 436 F. Supp. 1220 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
72. Id at 1230.
73. 330 F. Supp. 549, 551 (E.D. La. 1971), aft'd, 469 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1972).
74. 330 F. Supp. at 551.
75. 469 F.2d at 419.
76. Lieberthal v. North Country Lanes, Inc., 332 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1964).
77. St. Anthony-Minneapolis, Inc. v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., 316 F. Supp. 1045 (E.D.
Minn. 1970).
78. McClain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. La. 1977).
79. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012 (1976) removes
the business of insurance from Sherman Act coverage. In Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Phila-
delphia, 557 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1976), a significant case originating in Pennsylvania, the court
of appeals declined to exercise its jurisdiction because of the insurance exemption. The plain-
tiff hospital had alleged, inter alia, that the defendant induced a group boycott of plaintiffs
patients and that the defendant refused to deal with the plaintiff pursuant to an agreement
being negotiated with other hospitals. A state antitrust act could have operated against that
restraint. In Arizona, the state antitrust law was invoked in a similar case. In Sterman v.
Transamerica Title Ins. Co., No. 2-CA-CIV 2597 (Ariz. App. Jan. 18, 1978), plaintiff charged a
group of title insurers, rating bureaus, and a tide insurer's association with conspiracy to fix the
price of title insurance. The state court exercised jurisdiction ruling that extensive regulation of
the title insurance industry by the state insurance department does not preempt the field (pur-
suant to analogy to the federal act of state exemption of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943))
Beside the jurisdictional requirements, proceedings on behalf of
the United States are constrained by a lack of resources. Even when
a local antitrust violation sufficiently affects interstate commerce to
meet the jurisdictional requirements of the Sherman Act, the federal
Department of Justice may decline to pursue judicial action because
other enforcement problems are more significant."0 The Antitrust
Division of the Department of Justice is geared for complex monop-
olization and merger litigation.8 ' State enforcement mechanisms
are not. z Hence, efficient resource allocation is achieved when the
federal government handles larger cases while leaving less complex
matters, or those with decidedly local effects, to the states.
Moreover, the federal government should not be expected to
bear the burden of eliminating all trade restraints throughout the
nation.8 3  The role that states can play in fostering an operative cli-
mate of competition is within their obligations and capabilities" and
the contention that state antitrust laws will, ultimately, be detrimen-
tal to the state, by driving business from the state, is untenable. An-
titrust policy seeks to promote the
economic well-being through the free competitive system of pro-
ducing and marketing goods. Restraints of trade abridge this sys-
tem and hence are inimical to the economic health of the state. A
meaningful state antitrust enforcement program would have the
salutary effect of stimulating businesses within the state.
8 5
The states can fulfill their proper function as overseers of competi-
tive economies and complement the federal government by coordi-
nating their efforts with the United States Department of Justice and
attacking obvious and easily proved violations such as price fixing
and market and customer allocation. 6
and does not preclude application of the state antitrust laws to activities outside the regulatory
scheme.
80. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 5 1; Soma, supra note 59, at 332; Statement
by Vincent Yakowicz, supra note 15, at 2 (because of the flood of complaints and limited re-
sources, federal officials must be highly selective in initiating investigations and suits).
81. See, e.g., note 32 supra (monopoly litigation); United States v. Philadelphia Natl
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (merger litigation); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962) (merger litigation).
82. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT, Commissioner's Prefatory Note; STATE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 45; U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GRANTS To AID STATE ANTITRUST
ENFORCEMENT-APPLICATION MANUAL 7 (1977) (hereinafter cited as GRANTS); Statement by
Vincent Yakowicz supra note 15, at 2.
83. See remarks by Michael L. Zaleski, Assistant Attorney General, State of Wisconsin,
reprinted in STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, upra note 9, at 45.
84. Almstedt & Tyler, State Antitrust Law New Directions in Missouri, 39 Mo. L. REv.
489, 520 (1974).
85. State Antitrust Revival, supra note 66, at 579 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore,
forty-six other states have comparable regulations.
86. For even with limited investigative and prosecutorial resources, states can feasibly
"indict and convict beer distributors for price-fixing or paving contractors for bid-rigging."
STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 65; id at 45.
State enforcement, of course, presupposes the existence of suffi-
cient unreasonable trade restraints against which the federal govern-
ment cannot or will not act. Local incidence of antitrust violations,
however, is extensive,"7 as indicated by judicial actions in other
states"8 and by complaints from within Pennsylvania. 9
Price fixing in public procurement, for example, through identi-
cal bidding and other bid rigging, is prevalent9° and therefore a par-
ticularly appropriate target for state antitrust action. While
individual consumers may not be significantly injured by such
overcharges, damage to the Commonwealth in its proprietary capac-
ity is patent.9'
Such schemes deplete the public treasury and result in higher
taxes to state residents. State prosecution often effects a double
recovery in such case; the penalty or damages awarded are supple-
mented by the subsequent reduction in price and truly competitive
nature of future bids.
92
States also play an important enforcement role when obtaining
criminal penalties for violations.93 In State v. Lawn King, Inc., 94 an
individual defendant was sentenced to two concurrent six-month jail
terms and fined over $40,000 while a corporate defendant was fined
$120,000. 9- The penalties were imposed for vertical price fixing, ter-
ritorial allocation, tying, and other restraints on trade including an
invalid restraint on alienation and a requirement that resellers of de-
fendant's service engage in cooperative advertising.96 In Iowa a
87. Rahl, supra note 57, at 755; State Antitnst Revival, supra note 66, at 585.
88. See notes 94-100, 103-07 and accompanying text infra
89. See notes 121-124 and accompanying text infra.
90. E.g, State v. Robert L. Carr Co., [1978-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 62,052 (Dist. Ct.
Lyon County, Minn. 1978)(defendant pleaded guilty to indictment for conspiracy to rig public
construction bids and was fined $10,000, in addition to settling with a municipality for $20,000
for alleged collusion in submitting bids for a beautification project); State v. waste Manage-
ment of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 26 N.W.2d 147 (1978) (upholding conviction of a business
charged with conspiring to restrain trade in the garbage hauling industry by submitting rigged
bids to governmental subdivisions and allocating customers).
91. Statement by Vincent Yakowicz, supra note 15, at 2, 4-
92. State Antitrust Revival, supra note 66, at 585 (footnotes omitted).
93. See, e.g., note 89 supra, State v. Blyth, 226 N.W.2d 250 (Iowa 1975) (conviction for
conspiracy to fix prices).
94. 150 N.J. Super. 204, 375 A.2d 295 (Law Div. 1977) supplemented on other grounds,
152 N.J. Super. 333, 377 A.2d 1213 (Law Div. 1977).
95. Id. at 333, 377 A.2d at 1214.
96. Id Those restraints were imposed by a lawn care service corporation upon its local
franchises that provided the service. The price fixing was established by evidence that the
defendant required its local franchises to charge a set amount for lawn care service and moni-
tored its dealers' charges. The defendant allocated territories to its dealers by assigning each
franchise a certain territory and prohibiting each franchisee from entering another's territory.
(That violation was based on United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967),
which was overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) thus,
thrusting this ruling against exclusive territories into question.) The court also found that
Lawn King effectively tied the sale of its franchises to the requirement that dealers purchase
chemicals and seed through the corporation's distribution system. Lawn King further re-
strained trade by requiring franchisees to pay for cooperative advertising and to follow pre-
"boycott committee" was enjoined from attempting to induce a su-
permarket to sell only union label grapes and lettuce.97 An Ohio
court has invalidated restrictive lease covenants that effectively pro-
hibited a lessor from making future leases to any potential competi-
tor of the party that originally demanded the restriction.98
Injunctive relief has been awarded in New York against milk pro-
ducers and distributors for price fixing and customer allocation.99
Finally, civil relief can also take the form of penalties awarded to the
state as Texas has shown by collecting over $270,000 in civil penal-
ties in the last five years."°
Although a great number of criminal antitrust convictions have
not occurred, the civil penalties obtained by states and judgments for
private plaintiffs against local violators reflect the magnitude of the
wrongful trade practices.
Despite the broad range of potential applications of civil relief,
many noncriminal and some criminal proceedings do not reach trial.
Rather, most antitrust cases are settled by consent decree.' 0' Con-
sent judgments are used frequently because they reduce the time
necessary to conclude an antitrust litigation and also permit addi-
tional flexibility in providing a remedy. 10 2
Recent state court consent judgments have included prohibi-
tions of horizontal price fixing for private nursing 103 and towing
services in New Jersey" 4 and ambulance services in Illinois. 05 In
New York a group of process serving enterprises acceded to a con-
scribed formats and procedures in their individual advertising along with prohibiting dealers
from using their own names when advertising the sale of the business.
97. Foods, Inc. v. Leffler, 240 N.W.2d 914 (Iowa 1976).
98. State exrel. Brownv. Zayre of Ohio, Inc., 41 Ohio Misc. 117, 324 N.E.2d 186 (1974).
99. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LAW, ANTI-MONOPOLIES BUREAU ANNUAL REPORT 2
(1976). See also State v. Empire City Pharmaceutical Society, Inc., No. 40789/78 (Sup. Ct.,
New York City, May 11, 1978).
100. Letter from Michael M. Barron, Antitrust Division Chief, Texas Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, to Martin Howard Katz, Deputy Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Penn-
sylvania Dep't of Justice (June 13, 1978).
101. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 61; Letter from Thomas T. Wood, Dep-
uty Attorney General, State of Hawaii, to Harry A. Horwitz, Legal Assistant, Antitrust Divi-
sion, Pennsylvania Dep't of Justice (June 27, 1978).
A consent decree is a "device by which the defendant, while refusing to admit guilt, agrees
to modify its conduct and in some cases to accept certain remedies designed to correct the
violation asserted by the government." Speech by Senator John Tunney, 119 CONG. REc. 21
(1973).
102. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 61.
103. State v. Nurses Private Duty Registry, No. C-1834-76 (Super. Ct., Camden County,
N.J. Dec. 12, 1977).
104. State v. Allan's Towing Service, Inc., No. C-3605-76 (Super. Ct., Camden County,
N.J. April 20, 1978).
105. fn re Area Wide Ambulance Service & Jacksonville Ambulance Co., (Dec. 20,
1977), reported in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANTITRUST BULL. 7
(Feb. 8, 1978). See also In re Ikelite Underwater Sys., (Nov. 28, 1977), reported in NATIONAL
AsSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANTITRUST BULL. 12 (Feb. 8, 1978) (resale price
maintenance in Illinois for underwater photographic accessories).
sent order mandating that they abandon any conspiracy to coerce
independent process servers to terminate work for other process
serving firms."° A group of Colorado dairy companies that were
alleged to have paid illegal rebates and offered other inducements to
their large customers, entered into a consent judgment resulting in
fines and costs of $245,000.107 Thus, it is apparent that the consent
decree is a valuable antitrust enforcement tool.1
0 8
The plethora of successful cases in states with antitrust statutes
supports the inference that if Pennsylvania had such a law, similar
activities could be attacked. Skeptics may contend that merely be-
cause other states have found and acted against anticompetitive con-
duct, that is an inadequate justification for legislation in the
Commonwealth. Clear evidence is available, however, that unrea-
sonably anticompetitive conduct exists in the state.
From March to May 1977 the United States Department of Jus-
tice conducted the "Pittsburgh Project," a campaign centered in the
Pittsburgh area publicizing a toll-free telephone number by which
individuals could report incidents of anticompetitive conduct to the
Department. Many of the callers reported putatively illegal con-
duct; but because the interstate commerce jurisdictional requirement
was lacking, or the Department lacked adequate resources to pursue
each promising complaint, a significant number of the complaints
were not acted upon.' 9
Fifty-five of the grievances received would have justified further
investigation and possible prosecution."' Tie-ins and price discrim-
inations between food stores and food producers were reported in
Westmoreland and Allegheny counties. Price fixing for real estate
brokerage services were reported in various areas of the state. In
Adams and Northumberland counties some garagemen agreed to fix
the price for state motor vehicle inspections. Other instances of
price fixing tentatively identified dentists and mortgagees as offend-
106. State v. A.B.C. Process Serving Bureau, Inc., Index No. 40623/78 (Sup. Ct., New
York City April 11, 1978).
107. See COLO. DEP'T OF LAW, ANTITRUST SECTION 1975-78 4 (undated). See a/so id
at 3 (description of other successful Colorado cases ending in consent judgments).
108. Satisfactory resolution of a state antitrust claim can occur at even earlier stages of
litigation as long as the threat of vindication of a statutory right is available. E.g., NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION OF ATrORNEYS GENERAL, ANTITRUST BULL. 8 (May 10, 1978) (private North
Carolina nursing home agreed at a pre-complaint stage to terminate the use of fee schedules
leading to price fixing). Furthermore, official investigations may provide sufficient incentive
for businesses to cease objectionable practices. See N.Y. STATE DEP'T OF LAW ANIUAL RE-
PORT: ANTI-MONOPOLIES BuREAu 3-4 (1977).
109. Telephone conversation between Bruce Wilson, Attorney, Middle Atlantic Office,
United States Dep't of Justice, and Harry A. Horwitz, Legal Assistant, Pennsylvania Dep't of
Justice, Antitrust Division (June 30, 1978).
110: The reports originated from almost every county in the Commonwealth and ad-
dressed a variety of unreasonable restraints in which many types of businesses were involved.
More specific descriptions of the complaints are not available because these preliminary com-
plaints are confidential
ers. Informal allegations of predatory pricing, resale price mainte-
nance, conspiracy to monopolize, bid rigging, and horizontal market
division were also made. These are but a few examples of antitrust
violations that directly injure individuals, businesses, and the state.
The presence of antitrust violations also has been indicated in
Pennsylvania cases. In Bergstedt v. City of Pittsburgh, I the city
counterclaimed in the Allegheny Common Pleas Court for treble
damages for price fixing, but the plaintiff's preliminary objection to
the matter was sustained because the court lacked jurisdiction to en-
tertain the claim. A counterclaim for damages based upon an anti-
trust violation was equally unavailing in Revlon, Inc. v. Capitol
Beauty Supply Co., " for the same reason. These injuries, along
with those disclosed during the "Pittsburgh Project," cannot be re-
dressed adequately absent a state antitrust scheme.
Redress, however, is not the sole objective of an affirmative leg-
islative policy against unreasonable trade restraints." 3 A complete
state antitrust program is educational, for many business operators,
particularly smaller operators, may be unaware that their anticom-
petitive conduct would constitute unlawful practices.' Thus, an
active antitrust program may often remove impediments to competi-
tion without any litigation. The enactment of antitrust legislation in
Pennsylvania would attain these goals through the recognition of the
need to protect the state, its small businessmen, and consumers from
local restraints of trade." 15
There are no substantial reasons why the General Assembly
should not approve an antitrust law. Traditionally, this type of leg-
islation has been politically popular." 6  Furthermore, local antitrust
111. 121 Pitts LJ. 363 (Pa. C.P. Alleg. 1973). A private claimant may invoke as a de-
fense in state court the declaration in §1 of the Sherman Act that all contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies in restraint of trade are illegal. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
§45 (3rd ed. 1976). He may not, however, invoke that clause to recover damages in state
courts since the Act grants authority exclusively to the federal district courts to fashion a rem-
edy. 15 U.S.C. §15 (1976). See 15 U.S.C. §4 (1976)(equitable remedies to restrain alleged
antitrust violations are available only to United States attorneys through the federal district
courts).
112. 79 Dauph. 91 (Pa. C.P. 1963). The court, however, did rule that a federal antitrust
violation could be raised as a defense to a breach of contract action. Id. at 95.
113. For example, state attorneys general may assume greater activity as a public advo-
cate through the deterrent effect of active enforcement, by acting against increased organized
criminal activity in the economy, STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 1, and by provid-
ing advice to state departments and agencies to assure that their routine operations have mini-
mal anticompetitive effects. CoLo. DEP'T OF LAW, ANTITRUST SECTION 1975-1978, 7-8
(undated).
114. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, STATE PROSE-
CUTORS CRACK DOWN ON BUSINESS, Bus. WEEK 53 (May 15, 1978).
115. State Antitrust Revival, supra note 66, at 579, 585, 591.
116. At the federal level
[e]very Democratic and Republican party platform includes a promise to carry...
[antitrust] on, to strengthen and to outdo the previous administration. Annual re-
ports of heads of enforcement agencies point with pride to every statistic of increased
programs can operate at little or no cost to the state treasury since a
large part of enforcement activity is handled by the private bar." 7
When the state attorney general does act, however, his actions can be
financed through recoveries against violators that are placed in an
antitrust revolving fund for further enforcement use." 8
IV. Analysis of Necessary Provisions
4. Scope of Legislation
Pennsylvania antitrust law must prohibit intrastate violations
and interstate violations that significantly affect the Commonwealth
but against which the United States Department of Justice cannot or
will not act. i t 9 State regulation over activity that has a local nexus
and affects interstate commerce is the accepted jurisdictional scope
for state antitrust laws.' 20
The earliest indication that the Sherman Act should not pre-
empt state trade regulation was offered in a speech by Senator Sher-
man, the individual for whom that legislation was named.
This bill, as I would have it, has for its single object to invoke the
aid of the courts of the United States . . . to supplement the
enforcement of the established rules of the common and statutory
law by the courts of the several States in dealing with combinations
that affect injuriously the industrial liberty of these citizens of the
States.
It does not announce a new principle of law, but applies old
and well-recognized principles of the common law to the compli-
activity. Its political pedigree cannot be better demonstrated than by looking at
Congress, where it will be seen that no less than six committees, led by the top-
ranking judiciary committees, carry on a tremendous amount of continuing activity
in this area.
Rah], supra note 57, at 765 (footnotes omitted).
117. Dunne, supra note 31, at 353.
118. Eg., COLO. DEP'T OF LAW, ANTITRUST SECTION,1975-1978 1 (undated). See also
note 179 and accompanying text for a discussion of antitrust revolving funds; NATIONAL ASsO-
CIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, ANTITRUST REVOLVING FUNDS (March 1978).
119. State Antitrust Revival, supra note 66, at 585. See notes 80-82 and accompanying
text supra.
There are important areas, where, because of the purely intrastate nature of !he prac-
tice, or the failure of Congress to extend a particular facet of federal antitrust to the
constitutional limit, state antitrust enforcement may be the only available remedy.
In other areas where jurisdiction is concurrent, it may be the states that are better
equipped to treat the restraints, which though affecting or in commerce, are primarily
of local impact.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST HANDBOOK, FEDERAL-STATE CONFERENCE ON ANTI-
TRUST PROBLEMS 2 (1969) (footnotes omitted). But ef California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949)
(activities that are an offense against State and federal governments may be punished by ei-
ther).
120. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note; Rubin, supra
note 9, at 670. Other state statutes explicitly provide for intrastate enforcement as well as
interstate enforcement when the challenged practice has a local nexus and federal authorities
have not intervened. See, e.g., Bladen, The Needfor a New Antitnrst Statute 5 (undated)
(unpublished report for the Michigan Attorney General's Office); Almstedt and Tyler, supra
note 84, at 518. But see State v. Waste Management of Wis., Inc., 81 Wis. 2d 555, 261 N.W.2d
147 (1978).
cated jurisdiction of our State and Federal Government. 12 1
Subsequently, Mr. Justice Holmes, in Standard Oil Co. of Kentucky
v. Tennessee 22 declared that the Tennessee antitrust act was a valid
regulation even though it operated to remove an interference from
interstate commerce.
In response to the legislative purpose that the act supplement
state activity and the absence of any United States Supreme Court
interpretation that local antitrust laws would be preempted, many
federal' 23 and state 124 courts have ruled that federal antitrust legisla-
tion does not preempt the field. For example, the Second Circuit
has recognized that "[s]tate antitrust policy is not ousted from the
regulation of local matters which may also be affected by federal
laws." 2' A recent New Jersey decision, State v. Lawn King, Inc., 126
also rejected the idea that state regulation affecting interstate com-
merce is federally preempted. The court noted that if preemption
was the rule, all state regulation would fall because each "enterprise,
however localized, has some effect, however remote, on interstate
commerce. . . . That is why federal courts have held that the Sher-
man Act applies only where the business activities 'substantially af-
fect interstate commerce.' "27 In addition, the court concluded that
although many areas require exclusive federal regulation, since Con-
gress and the Supreme Court have never delineated those areas in
the Sherman Act's long history, no preemption could be found.'28
Finally, the court rejected the argument that failure to find preemp-
tion would subject the defendant to conflicting state and federal law,
because many interstate concerns are subject to both state and fed-
eral regulation.' 29
121. 21 CONG. REc. 2456-57 (1890) (emphasis added).
122. 217 U.S. 413 (1910).
123. See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cit. 1971), af'don other growndr, 407
U.S. 258 (1972); Woods Exploration & Producing Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 438 F.2d
1286 (5th Cir. 1971) cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972); Matthews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee
Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943).
124. See, e.g., Speegle v. Board of Fire Underwriters, 29 Cal. 2d 34,172 P.2d 867 (1946);
Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950); People's Say. Bank v. Stod-
dard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960); State v. Lawn King, Inc., 150 N.J. Super. 204,
375 A.2d 295 (Law Div.) supplemented on other ground, 152 N.J. Super. 333, 377 A.2d 1214,
(Law Div. 1977); Leader Theater Corp. v. Rand Force Amusement Corp., 186 Misc. 280, 58
N.Y.S.2d 304 (Sup. Ct. 1945), afd, 273 App. Div. 844, 76 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1948); Texas v.
Southeast Tex. Chapter of Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n., 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex. Civ. App.
1962); Washington v. Sterling Theaters Co., 64 Wash. 2d 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964); State v.
Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960).
125. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 267 (2d Cir. 1971) affdon other grounds, 407 U.S. 258
(1972).
126. 150 N.J. Super. 204, 375 A.2d 295 (Law Div. 1977).
127. Id at 218-19, 375 A.2d at 302 (citations omitted). See Rasmussen v. American
Dairy Ass'n, 472 F.2d 517, 526 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950 (1973).
128. Id at 217, 375 A.2d at 301; see State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290,
101 N.W.2d 133 (1960).
129. 150 N.J. Super. at 216, 375 A.2d at 301. The court offered the example that manu-
Although these decisions permit state laws to extend beyond in-
trastate activities, a concerted effort must be made to coordinate state
and federal enforcement. The position of the Antitrust Division of
the United States Department of Justice is "that federal and state
antitrust enforcement will be most effective in preserving the benefits
of a free and competitive economy to the extent that the respective
enforcement activities of each are complementary."' 30 Thus, anti-
trust enforcement is a particularly appropriate area for state and fed-
eral cooperation to enforce a national policy that extends from local
competitive impediments to major interstate trade restraints and mo-
nopolies. '3'
B. Uniformity v. Particularization
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has drafted antitrust legislation that it recommends for adop-
tion by the states. 32 Presumably, this legislation both eases the
compliance burden on multistate operations without substantially
increasing the burden of complying with federal law'33 and obviates
litigation to determine what state law governs in private damage ac-
tions.134 These are cogent reasons supporting the adoption of some
consistent legislation for the states, but the deficiencies in the Uni-
form Act are patent, 35 and more particularized drafting is necessary.
States that are entering the antitrust enforcement field should
adopt laws patterned after the federal law to enable state courts to
facturers of automobiles and childrens' garments that are treated with flame retardants are
subject to various levels of state and federal law. Id
Furthermore, in State v. Allied Chem. & Dye Corp., 9 Wis. 2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133
(1960), the court based its finding against preemption, in part, on the basis that there was no
inherent conflict in the policies behind the state and federal antitrust laws.
130. GRANTS, supra note 82, at 7.
131. Section 4(f) of the Clayton Act expressly directs the United States Attorney General
to cooperate with state officials by informing state attorneys general when a parens patriae
action may be appropriate, and also to give state attorneys general, upon request, relevant
information obtained by the federal department. 15 U.S.C. § 15(f) (1976). A recent federal
district court decision expanded the scope of available information to evidence gathered by
federal grand juries. In re Montgomery County Real Estate Antitrust Litigation. [1978-1]
TRADE CAS. (CCH) 162,070 (D.Md. 1978).
Cooperation between officials of various states is also a valuable enforcement aid. This
coordination is provided in a bill presently pending in the Pennsylvania House of Representa-
tives, Pa. H. No. 845, Printer's No. 2578, Session of 1977 [hereinafter cited as H.B. 845], § 22,
and is encouraged by the United States Department of Justice. See GRANTS, SUpra note 82,
at 8.
132. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT. This proposal is presently pending in the Penn-
sylvania Senate in substantially unamended form as Pa. S. No. 681, Printer's No. 723, Session
of 1977 [hereinafter cited as S.B. 681]. Only Arizona has adopted the Uniform Act since it
was promulgated in 1973. ARz. RE V. STAT. §§ 44-1401 to 44-1413 (Supp. 1977).
133. UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.
134. Id; Rubin, supra note 9, at 724.
135. See notes 142-46, 175, 177, 183, 189-92, 204-05 and accompanying text infra.
use federal cases for guidance and precedent." 6 "Such a procedure
eases the problem often encountered in state courts: the unfamiliar-
ity of the state judiciary, at least in the inferior tribunals, with the
antitrust field."' 37  Furthermore, state regulations must be tailored
to the needs of the individual state.1
38
C. Substantive Prohibitions
At present, two antitrust bills are before the Pennsylvania Gen-
eral Assembly- S.B. (Senate Bill) 6811"9, which is modeled after the
Uniform Act, and H.B. (House Bill) 845.14' Both of these bills ad-
dress the fundamental restraint of trade offense as it was developed
at common law and codified and expanded under the Sherman Act.
The senate bill, however, adds the caveat that the restraint on trade
must occur within a relevant market.' 4 ' This addition greatly tran-
scends Sherman Act jurisprudence, for violations that are per se un-
reasonable have never been subject to relevant market analysis.
142
Nevertheless, the jurisdictional scope of the senate bill is less defined
than the house proposal because its coverage is limited to the rele-
vant market; ie. "[t]he geographical area of actual or potential com-
petition in a line of commerce, all or any part of which is within this
Commonwealth."' 143  House Bill 845, however, applies to trade or
commerce that is defined as "[t]he advertising, offering for sale, sale
or distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangi-
ble, real, personal or mixed, and any other article, commodity, or
thing of value wherever situate and includes any trade or commerce
directly or indirectly affecting the people of this Commonwealth." 144
An antimonopoly section is also contained in both pieces of leg-
islation. The House approach closely parallels the Sherman Act by
prohibiting any person from monopolizing, attempting to monopo-
lize, or combining or conspiring with any other person or persons to
136. Cf. Rahl, supra note 57, at 772-73 (noting that caution should be exercised in copy-
ing the federal jurisprudence).
137. State Antitrst Revival supra note 66, at 587 (footnote omitted).
138. Rubin, supra note 9, at 656; see, e.g.,HAwAii REv. STAT. § 480-31 (1976) (allows
two Honolulu newspapers to have joint ownership and separate editorial policies on the ra-
tionale that it is better to allow partial merger and retain independent comment than to lose
that comment through complete merger); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-17 (1975) (prohibits specific
tie-in by lenders who attempt to require borrowers to deal with particular insurers).
139. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at §3. Criticisms addressed to S.B. 681 apply directly to
the Uniform Act.
140. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at §3.
141. S.B. 681 supra note 132, at §3.
142. See Dunne, supra note 31, at 333 n.19 (Oregon rejected relevant market analysis
for restraints of trade in its antitrust law). Contra, UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 2
Commissioners' Comment.
143. S.B. 681 supra note 132, at §2 (UNIFORM STATE ANTrTRUST AcT §1).
144. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at §3.
monopolize any part of trade or commerce within Pennsylvania.' 45
Senate Bill 681 narrows the offense of conspiracy to monopolize with
the denunciation that, "[t]he establishment, maintenance or use of a
monopoly, or an attempt to establish a monopoly, of trade or com-
merce in a relevant market by any person for the purpose of exclud-
ing competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices is
unlawful."'" The Sherman Act does not require proof of a preda-
tory intent to control competition and prices. The senate proposal
thus places an additional burden on antitrust plaintiffs, a burden that
might be more appropriately borne by a monopolist defendant as an
affirmative defense to prove the absence of that intent.1
47
D. Exemptions
Various activities are exempt from the Sherman Act, most nota-
bly, the activity of labor and agricultural organizations acting unilat-
erally in furtherance of their legitimate goals.' 48  Similar exclusions
serve an important function at the state level. Although the senate
bill directly parallels the two noted federal exemptions, 149 the house
bill goes further and excludes from coverage acts of consumer orga-
nizations and their members that are directed solely to legitimate
consumer objectives."' Under the house scheme, activities regu-
lated by the state or federal governments would be exempt if that
regulation were so comprehensive that antitrust enforcement is un-
necessary or would be disruptive of the regulatory structure.' 5' This
145. Id § 5.
146. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at § 4 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT §'3).
147. See STATE ANTrrRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 12-13; Dunne, supra note 31, at 333
n.19; Rubin, supra note 9, at 729.
148. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976).
149. S.B. 681, supra note 132 at § 5 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 4).
150. S.B. 845, supra note 132 at § 6(a) (3).
151. Id § 6(b); see, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 646.740(30) (1977). This provision is based
on the act of state exemption first announced in Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). But see
Bladen, supra note 120, at 11 (competitors may more easily combine when their action is
exempt from antitrust liability). The Parker doctrine exempts anticompetitive conduct en-
gaged in as an act of government, by the state as sovereign, or its subdivisions, pursuant to
state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service.
While the state action exemption was initially broad, that doctrine of immunity has re-
cently been narrowed. The Supreme Court ruled in City ofLafayette, Louisiana v. Louiriana
Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) that municipal utility operators are considered persons
within the meaning of the federal antitrust laws and that there is no implied exclusion from the
Sherman Act for municipal utilities. The plurality opinion echoed the Parker doctrine and
emphasized that anticompetitive conduct is permissible only when it is undertaken pursuant to
valid state policy to displace competition.
In United States v. Texas State Board of Public Accountancy, [1978-11 TRADE CAS. (CCH)
162,039 (W.D.Tex. 1978) the United States District Court in Texas struck down a rule promul-
gated by the Texas accountancy board that prohibited licensed public accountants from mak-
ing competitive bids for their professional services. The Board sought to sustain the rule
based on the state action exemption. The rule had been putatively issued pursuant to a Texas
statute that authorized the Board to promulgate rules to establish and maintain a high degree
of integrity in the accounting profession. The court held, however, that the Parker doctrine
type of exemption is consistent with federal law and helps to insure
that businesses will not be subject to regulatory "overkill."' 52
E. Official Investigations
Potent investigative authority is necessary for the attorney gen-
eral to detect the existence of antitrust violations.
[E]ffective enforcement requires full and comprehensive investiga-
tion before formal proceedings. . . are commenced. Incomplete
investigation may mean proceedings not justified by more careful
search and study. Public retreat by the prosecutor may then be
difficult, if not impossible, and the result may be a public trial
exhausting the resources of the litigant and increasing court con-
gestion. Thus the adequacy of investigatory processes can make
or break any enforcement program.'5
3
Early state antitrust laws did not authorize an adequate precom-
plaint civil investigative process. Instead state enforcement agencies
possessed three equally unsatisfactory alternatives-- "the voluntary
cooperation of suspects and witnesses, the filing of a civil complaint
for the purpose of utilizing discovery procedures, and resort to grand
jury processes."' 54  Authorization of precomplaint civil investigative
demands (CID's) for state attorneys general thus becomes an inte-
gral component of any serious antitrust enforcement program. 55
Both proposals before the General Assembly follow the
amended version of the Antitrust Civil Process Act'56 and include
similar provisions authorizing civil investigative process. The inves-
tigative device of the House version is designated an antitrust inves-
tigative subpoena 57 that will issue from the Commonwealth Court
when that court has reason to believe the subpoenaed person may
have knowledge of or subpoenaed documents may contain matter
did not immunize the defendant from liability because the statute did not mandate the an-
ticompetitive conduct that the rule required.
Furthermore, a United States Justice Department official recently indicated that any regu-
latory activity undertaken by state and local governments could raise antitrust issues. At a
speech before the 72nd Annual Conference of the Municipal Finance Officers Association in
Houston, Texas, on May 15, 1978, Joe Sims, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the
Antitrust Division, concluded that the only thing that is clear regarding the state action exemp-
tion is that the current United States Supreme Court is not easily impressed with state action
defenses.
152. See note 151 supra.
153. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS,
REPORT 343-44 (1955).
154. Rubin, supra note 9, at 715.
155. For example, in Minnesota CID's are one of the most valuable tools to investigate
antitrust complaints. Often the Minnesota Attorney General's Office will receive complaints
or uncover suspicious activity that could not be pursued without CID's. Letter from Alan H.
Maclin, Special Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, State of Minnesota, to Martin Howard Katz, Deputy Attorney General, Chief-Antitrust
Division, Pennsylvania Dep't of Justice (June 28, 1978).
156. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-1314 (1976).
157. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 8(b).
relevant to an investigation.' 58  The senate bill is broader in al-
lowing the demand to require the production of information or any
tangible object (not merely a document) when the attorney general
has reasonable cause to believe the person served is in possession or
control of the information or object.'59 If the person served does not
comply with or objects to service, the attorney general may then seek
a court order directing compliance.160
Confidentiality of material obtained through civil investigative
process is important to encourage compliance and this need is recog-
nized in the House and senate legislation. Information derived from
a demand authorized by the senate bill remains confidential unless
the individual testifying or producing the document grants a waiver,
or if the court authorizes disclosure. 6' The house version also al-
lows the person named in the antitrust investigative subpoena to
waive confidentiality of information supplied.
162
In addition to the screen of confidentiality, the house bill pro-
vides other protection to those served with antitrust investigative
subpoenas. The attorney general may not request privileged matter
or other information that would be unreasonable or improper if de-
manded by any other Pennsylvania court. 163  The person producing
the information may retain a copy of the document or transcript. 164
A person giving testimony may also have his attorney present in a
nonparticipatory role.165  By incorporating these safeguards against
improper intrusion into an individual's right to privacy, the house
legislation attains a more equitable balance between private rights
and the need for effective law enforcement procedures.
166
F Penalties and Remedies
A broad range of punitive and remedial devices are essential ,to
any legislative antitrust program. The state must be empowered to
158. Id at § 8 (c). The antitrust investigative subpoena is not available, however, once
any state statutory antitrust action is brought against an individual who would otherwise be
served. Id at § 8(b).
159. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at § 7(a) (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT, § 6(a)).
160. S.B. 681, Id. at § 7(b) (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT, § 6(b)).
161. S.B. 681, Id. at § 7(c) (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT,§ 6(c)), roughly paralleling
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, § 4(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976).
162. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 8(k). In addition, those served with antitrust investi-
gative subpoenas may obtain information supporting the subpoena unless it is privileged or is
subject to a protective order. Id § 8j). Thus, during the course of an investigation, informa-
tion supplied at an early stage, and upon which a later antitrust investigative subpoena issues,
may be obtained by the person subsequently served.
163. Id at § 8(e).
164. Id at § 8(j), paralleling the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976, § 3(i)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 1312 (i)(2),(6) (1976).
165. H. B. 845, supra note 131, at § 8(j).
166. Statement of Vincent Yakowicz, supra note 15, at 5.
impose criminal and civil 167 sanctions on offenders, and injured per-
sons must be able to secure compensation for injuries sustained. In-
junctive relief is also vital to enable public and private plaintiffs to
terminate continuing and threatened irreparable harm resulting
from unreasonable trade restraints.
1. Criminal Penalties. -- Criminal penalties serve the funda-
mental goals of retribution, rehabilitation, protection of the public
68
and deterrence. Although imprisonment attains these objectives
with greater potency than criminal fines, corporations are only sub-
ject to fines.' 69  Numerous authorities have observed that fines do
not adequately deter anticompetitive conduct, but instead are often
viewed as mere "license fees."' 170 Moreover, even the possibility or
likelihood of large fines may play no deterrent role when an execu-
tive knows his legal expenses will be reimbursed by his corpora-
tion. '' Nevertheless, the availability of jail terms has also been
subject to substantial criticism. Critics contend that such harsh pen-
alties deter competitor complaints, 172 seem disproportionate to the
wrong committed, and are not administered consistently. 73  These
contentions were considered in State v. Lawn King, Inc., 17 but the
court declined to accept them, reasoning as follows:
[Tihe basis of the charge is that the defendants have abused a
trust, the result of which is destructive of the overall fabric of our
society that is based on the spirit of free enterprise....
The taking of money from the public by such illegal activity
is no different than the illegal taking of money by the butcher who
puts his thumb on the scale or the vendor who dilutes his product
with water or another product. In all of these cases the public is
167. Often the evidence in a case may be insufficient for the state to obtain a criminal
conviction, although the lesser burden of proof for civil remedies may be met. Also, budget
priorities day render criminal prosecutions a deficient resolution of a violation. STATE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 62. Therefore both civil and criminal sanctions including con-
sent decrees should be available to the state.
On the need for criminal penalties, see notes 168-175 and accompanying text infra.
168. A legislature may obviate the rehabilitation and incapacitation goals with respect to
individual offenders without imposing a jail sentence. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-11
(Supp. 1977) (any individual who is a principal, agent, or major shareholder of a corporation
and who knowingly violates the state antitrust law is forbidden from dealing directly or indi-
rectly with the corporation).
169. See also J. Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45
TEx. L. REv. 1301 (1967) (chief value of criminal fine against a corporation is that the business
entity is branded a criminal).
170. State v. Lawn King, Inc., 152 NJ. Super. 333, 340, 377 A.2d 1214, 1218 (Law Div.
1977); STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 63 (Wisconsin antitrust staff feels the availa-
bility of imprisonment aids witness cooperation); Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 84, at 506.
171. Soma, supra note 59, at 31.
172. Id; Rahl, supra note 57, at 764; Rubin, supra note 9, at 512.
173. State Antitrust Laws, supra note 9, at 63; Rubin, supra note 9, at 712. These argu-
ments must fail when confronted by egregious, invidious, and coercive anticompetitive prac-
tices.
174. 152 N.J. Super. 333, 377 A.2d 1214 (Law Div. 1977).
ultimately compelled to pay a greater price. 175
S.B. 681 has no criminal penalties; this is one reason that con-
tributed to the rejection of the Uniform Act in Oregon. 176  Con-
versely, the house proposal would permit corporate criminal fines to
reach $1,000,000 while other legal entities could be fined up to
$100,000 and natural persons could also receive up to three years
incarceration.177 The fines recovered by the state would be placed
into an antitrust enforcement fund to finance state antitrust activi-
ties.' 78  A moderately successful antitrust record could thus render
state enforcement self-sustaining 179 although the attorney general's
activity should be subject to some safeguards ensuring that the legis-
lature retains control over the enforcement program. This result
could be achieved by requiring that the General Assembly annually
appropriate funds that have been deposited in the antitrust enforce-
ment fund prior to expenditure by the attorney general.
2 Civil Penalties.- Regardless of whether criminal sanctions
are pursued, the attorney general may also seek a civil penalty of up
to $100,000 or $500 per day per violation under the house propo-
sal. 8 0 The Uniform Act/Senate version would merely permit an
assessment of a $50,000 civil penalty.'
The forfeiture of a corporate charter or the right to do business
in the state is another available civil penalty. Although this punitive
measure has deterrent effect, it is harsh and should be invoked with
caution,18 2 for if forfeiture means that a local business will cease op-
eration, the local economy will be injured to the extent that jobs are
lost and income producing capacity is reduced. If forfeiture of the
right to do business would only result in transfer of ownership of a
175. Id at 336, 377 A.2d at 1216.
176. Dunne, supra note 31, at 333 n.19.
177. H.B. 845, supra note 31 at § 14(b). Criminal defendants are protected, however,
since criminal penalties are imposed only when knowing violations occur or when a principal,
agent or major shareholder knowingly aids the violation. Id See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:9-
1 l(b) (Supp. 1977) (similar "knowing" requirements).
178. H. B. 845 supra note 131, at § 18. The enforcement fund would be the repository
of money received by Pennsylvania from the attorney general's enforcement of Pennsylvania
or federal antitrust law. Thus, when the state sues in its proprietary capacity in either state (see
note 190-93 and accompanying text infra) or federal (see note 53 and accompanying text
supra) courts, those recoveries are placed in the antitrust enforcement fund. The Uniform
Act-Senate bill does not authorize an antitrust revolving fund.
179. Nine states have antitrust enforcement funds, known generically as antitrust revolv-
ing funds. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 41-191.02 (1974); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 12526 (West
1964); KAN. STAT. § 75-713 (1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.081 (Vernon Supp. 1978); N.J. REv.
STAT. § 58:4-14 (1977); OHio REV. CODE ANN § 109.82 (Baldwin 1978); OR. REV. STAT. §
180.095-97 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.10.220 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 47-18-19 (1976).
180. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 12(a).
181. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at § 8 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 7).
182. Atkins, The Illinois Attorney General's Role In Consumer Proiection--Illinos Anti-
trast Act, Consumer Fraud Act, And Other Available Remedies, 15 ANTITRUST BULL. 367, 374
(1970); Dunne, supra note 31, at 343; Soma, supra note 59, at 43.
business entity, however, no aggregate loss to the state's economy' 1 3
will occur. Concomitantly, no loss to the economy would be gener-
ated if the offending franchise were lost and the controlling parties
resumed business operations as another enterprise.
Although the senate bill makes no provision for remedial forfei-
ture, the house bill allows forfeiture and permits the appropriate
court to place the business in receivership to allow damaged plain-
tiffs to claim assets as general creditors.
84
3. Private Enforcement. -An effective antitrust statute must
also encourage private litigation to ease the state's enforcement bur-
den and to provide redress for injured parties.'85 Allowing plaintiffs
to sue for treble damages 186 is an incentive to private enforcement
and serves the goals of deterrence and punishment.'87 The bills
pending in the Pennsylvania legislature provide for treble damages
for injured persons, but whereas the award is automatic under the
House bill, 88 the senate proposal allows treble damages only if the
court finds that the violation is flagrant. 89
4. State Treble Damages Recovery. -When the state is suing
in its proprietary capacity for damages sustained-such as
overcharges for price fixing in public procurement-it should also be
permitted to seek treble damages. As a damaged purchaser, the
state should not be treated differently from other plaintiffs. 190 Al-
though the senate proposal 9' follows those commentators who
would limit state recovery to single damages, 192 the house version
183. When an individual is prohibited from conducting business within the state, the
enterprise may continue in operation with no loss to the local economy if the convicted party
merely sells his interest in the firm.
184. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 12 (c),(d).
185. United States v. Borden Co., 347 U.S. 514, 518 (1954); Osborne v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 324 F.2d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 1963); Klor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 255 F.2d 214, 217
(9th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Kinnear-Weed Corp. v. Humble
Oil and Refining Co., 214 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1954).
186. State treble damage authorizations are patterned after §§ 4f and 4a of the Clayton
Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 15a (1976).
187. Mohr & Sons, Inc. v. Janhke, 55 Wis. 2d 402, 411-12, 198 N.W.2d 363, 368 (1973);
Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 84, at 490 n. 1.
188. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 10.
189. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at § 9(b) (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT § 8(b)). The
Uniform Act is so worded because "the automatic trebling of damages under the Clayton Act
• . . can bring about an in terrorem settlement by a defendant of a defensible case." UNIFORM
STATE ANTITRUST ACT § 8, Commissioners' Comment.
190. Almstedt & Tyler, supra note 84, at 518; Letter from Alvin Alexanderson, Assistant
Attorney General, Antitrust Division, Oregon Department of Justice, to Martin Howard Katz,
Deputy Attorney General, Chief-Antitrust Division, Pennsylvania Dep't of Justice (June 20,
1978) (Oregon has brought no damage actions under state law, partly because the state is
limited to single damages).
191. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at § 9(a) (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT § 8(a)).
192. UNIFORM STATE A4TITRUST ACT § 8, Commissioners' Comment; Rubin, supra
note 9, at 708 (state does not require the encouragement of treble damages because the state
makes the treble damage award available to any public body of the
Commonwealth.' 93
5. Parens Patriae Suits. -Attorney general parens patriae194
suits in Pennsylvania courts brought on behalf of injured natural
persons, who are residents of Pennsylvania, are another essential
weapon in the antitrust arsenal. Although the Uniform Act/senate
version contains no parenspatriae authorization, the house bill ex-
plicitly defines a procedure that closely parallels the federal law.'9 5
Under the house bill, when the attorney general initiates a suit on
behalf of injured individuals, he must provide them with notice of
the action. 96 Those who wish to opt out and pursue their claims
independently may do so; failure of a potential plaintiff to indicate
that he wishes to exclude his claim from any judgment will render
the claim res judicata197 Because calculation and distribution of
damages in parenspatriae litigation can become an unwieldy task if
not subject to strict guides, H.B. 681 stipulates that in price fixing
cases damages may be calculated by statistical or sampling meth-
ods 98 and by specifying the manner of distributing any recovery. 199
Thus, not only is parenspatriae litigation feasible but it is an essen-
tial tool enabling the attorney general to act as advocate for the
Commonwealth's citizens.2 °"
6 Indirect Purchaser Suits. -Parens patriae authorization,
without more, may not be an adequate legislative declaration to pro-
tect damaged consumers. A positive legislative policy must also ex-
plicitly permit an indirect purchaser to sue antitrust violators whose
offense has resulted in injury to the ultimate purchaser. Although
this is the only suggested provision that does not presently parallel
the federal law, it is the sine qua non for most price fixing suits (not
attorney general is supported by a full-time staff and the state treasury); see Dunne, supra note
31, at 346-47.
193. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 10.
194. See note 53 supra.
195. 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
196. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § l1(b)(2), paralleling 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(1) (1976).
197. Id. at § 11(b)(3),(4), paralleling 15 U.S.C. § 15c(b)(2) (1976).
198. Id. at § II(c), paralleling 15 U.S.C. § 15d (1976); see generally Hoyt, Dahl & Gib-
son, Comprehensive Models For Assessing Lost Profits To Antitnsrt Plaintiffs, 60 MINN. L. REV.
1233 (1976).
199. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § l1(d), paralleling 15 U.S.C. § 15c (1976).
200. Statement of Vincent Yakowiez, supra note 15, at 6. Often the individual claims of
consumers are so small that litigation would never be initiated by the actual injured party.
Parenspatriae authority overcomes this impediment.
The first state parenspatrlae suit, which was recently settled, resulted in an agreement to
pay $3.5 million to injured California consumers. The complaint, California v. Levi Strauss &
Co., filed with the Superior Court in San Francisco, No. 739024, June 2, 1978, alleged resale
price maintenance by the manufacturer of "Levi's" pants, slacks and jeans. The money will
be distributed to the Californians who purchased the firm's products at retail from 1972 to
1975, the alleged period of violation. Sm [19781 TRADn Rao, R. (CCH) 6 (June 26, 1978).
merely parenspatriae actions). Furthermore, congressional activity
to allow these suits is nearing the final stages. 20 1 While the Uniform
Act/senate bill makes no provisions for such "pass-on" suits, the
house bill2" 2 allows "pass-on" of price over charges to be used offen-
sively by indirect buyers and defensively by defendants against
plaintiffs who have not absorbed overcharges generated by anticom-
petitive practices.
7. Injunctive Relief--Comprehensive antitrust legislation
should include, in addition to penal and compensatory remedies,
preventive relief to enjoin continuing and irreparable harm. Both
proposals before the General Assembly contain sections that would
allow injunctive relief on behalf of the state and threatened per-
sons.20 3  Furthermore, all the suggested remedies are cumulative
proposals2' reflecting the desire that comprehensive relief be avail-
able. The rights of defendants are safeguarded from the attorney
general's unjustified use of the antitrust arsenal under the house bill
by awarding attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant if legal action
was commenced in bad faith, vexatiously or wantonly.20 5
8. Voluntary Compliance Procedures.-A pretrial settlement
procedure is another valuable antitrust device because it allows the
use of remedial measures without the expenditure of the requisite
litigation costs. Although the Uniform Act/senate bill does not ad-
dress the propriety of consent judgments, the house bill does allow
an antitrust defendant to enter into an assurance of voluntary com-
pliance (AVC) to discontinue the alleged violation and to make vol-
untary payments to damaged persons or public bodies.20 6
Paralleling the federal law,207an AVC is not considered a violation
201. See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
202. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 10.
203. S.B. 68 1, supra note 132, at § 8 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT § 7) (injunction
in the name of the state); Id at § 9 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST ACT § 8(a)(injunction for
other persons); H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 9(b) (injunction for the state); Id at § 9(c)
(injunction for others).
204. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at§ 12 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 11); H.B. 845,
supra note 131, at § 21.
Cumulative remedies are constitutional despite their potential severity. In City of
Madison v. Hyland, Hall & Co., 73 Wis. 2d 364, 243 N.W.2d 422, appeal dimissed 429 U.S.
953 (1976), the court awarded the plaintiff cumulative remedies and stated that
[miere severity of sanctions in antitrust cases does not make them per se exces-
sive or disproportionate in a constitutional sense. What is at stake, in the legisla-
ture's judgment, is our system of free enterprise and competition. The
constitutionality of the penalty is, therefore to be measured not by actual damages
sustained by a private party, but by the value of the public's interest in enforcing the
laws that are designed to preserve our economic system.
Id at 387, 243 N.W.2d at 434.
205. H.B. 845, supra note 131, at § 11(e). The Uniform Act-Senate Bill contains no
analogous section.
206. Id at§13.
207. 15 U.S . § 16(a) (1978); see Soma, supra note 59, at 38.
for any purpose. 20 But in both proposals an affirmative judgment
in favor of Pennsylvania in an action in which testimony has been
taken operates as prima facie evidence in certain subsequent pro-
ceedings. 209  The prima facie evidence procedure conserves judicial
and adversarial resources by obviating the presentation of redundant
evidence regarding identical issues in successive cases, thus perform-
ing a valuable function in antitrust enforcement.
V. Conclusion
Presently, the need for antitrust enforcement in Pennsylvania is
vital. The attorney general and private parties must be given the
power to move against local restraints of trade.21 ° Penalties and
remedies should operate efficiently to penalize violators, encourage
private enforcement, and compensate those injured by violations.
In sum, the antitrust program must ensure that trade and commerce
flows unimpeded. This will require the legislature to take a decisive
step and enact a comprehensive program undaunted by private busi-
ness interests, for basic antitrust policy would entail no additional
compliance burden beyond that imposed by the federal government.
Legislation alone, however, will not ensure productive antitrust
activity. Adequate funds must also be appropriated by the General
Assembly to supply the attorney general with the specialized staff
that is required and to meet the cost of litigation until the recoveries
from antitrust enforcement are sufficient to support prosecutions and
civil actions on behalf of the state. 2t' The antitrust problem exists
and will continue to exist in Pennsylvania until an affirmative ap-
proach toward resolution is commenced. That solution rests in the
hands of the legislature.
208. H.B. 845, supranote 131 at §13; see Dunne, supra note 31, at 350.
209. S.B. 681, supra note 132, at § 10 (UNIFORM STATE ANTITRUST AcT § 9); H.B. 845,
supra note 131, at § 17.
The House Bill provides that the judgment operates as prima facie evidence for all mat-
ters that would be an estoppel to the parties of the action. Although the terms of S.B. 681 are
generally identical to the Uniform Act, § 10 of the former diverges slightly from § 9 of the
latter. The Senate Bill would allow prior judgment to operate as prima facie evidence only in
a subsequent action by the Commonwealth while the Uniform Act extends the evidentiary rule
to actions brought by any person injured or threatened with injury in his business or property.
Thus divergence probably reflects an oversight on the part of the draftsman of the Senate Bill,
since the utility and purpose of consent procedures would be largely undermined under S.B.
681, § 10.
210. Rahl, supra note 57, at 771, 781; Soma, supra note 59, at 44.
211. Rahl, supra note 57, at 764; Slate Antitrust Reyvial, supra note 66, at 592.
Wisonsin Assistant Attorney General Michael Zaleski has identified four working essen-
tials for state antitrust divisions: permanent legal personnel assigned to antitrust, permanent
investigative personnel assigned to antitrust, money authorized for antitrust, and continual
formal and informal investigations. STATE ANTITRUST LAWS, supra note 9, at 37.
